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I. Introduction
The old controversy about whether wage and price controls are
instrumental or not in bringing down the rate of inflation
was never quite buried in the U.S., although after the appa-
rent failure of Nixon's Economic Stabilization Program of
1971-1974 (ESP) to achieve its desired goals, even the
enthusiasm of Incomes Policy advocates appeared for a while
to have been mitigated. Defeat however, was never acknowledged,
by its defenders. All type of ex-post rationalizations
were offered as to, why, in the case of controls having been
properly implemented and coordinated with more responsible
monetary and fiscal policy, they would have eventually succeeded
and not been thwarted in holding the reins of an inflation
which from a brisk trot before the imposition of the ESP had
set forth in an unbridled gallop at the end of it.
Vanquishing inflation has certainly never been a pure academic
problem since the costs of either living with it or putting
an end to it have always been too real for everybody. But the
Reagan administration's belief in a supply-side free lunch
as an effective weapon against inflation has rekindled the
debate. There is an increased willingness to have yet another
go at controls of those who always seeing wage inflation
as the big culprit" do not think that moderate
fiscal and monetary restraint together with the measures to
reduce costs and boost productivity (as Reagan's administration
has set out to do) can alone curb priceinflation without the
parallel complementary effect of some direct mandatory
wage restraint.
The main opponents of policed wage-setting have always been
the hard-core monetarists who very rightly pointed out the
inability of "cost-pushers" to distinguish between absolute and
relative price increases when they use a concept such as
"monopoly-power" to explain how generalized inflation can be
set off. If inflation is a monetary phenomenon, everywhere, so— 3 —
their argument goes, controls are ineffective since they
attack the symptoms without doing anything about the cause.
The only point on which both main rival groups agreed
was that affecting expectations of inflation in a down-
ward direction would do the trick. However the way to go about
it signals yet another point of departure beween them since
one can always argue that if controls do not seem to affect
inflation, and were unsuccessful during the past in fighting
it, why people would continue to believe they will now
succeed in doing so.
On ithe other had the recent experience of Mrs. Thatcher's
government in the U.K. is showing that just applying steady
monetary and fiscal squeeze on demand to curb inflation
(even with parallel preainouncement of monetary policy to
influence inflationary expectations) may be a much slower
and painful remedy than what originally was made out to be
(necessary creation of the so called "reserve army of
unemployed") .
It will not be attempted here to give a detailed description
of all the arguments for and against controls as a remedy
against inflation, since it would extend the length of the
study far too much and it has already been thoroughly
studied and documented in the literature, (for a good over-
view see for instance: Andersen and Turner (1), Jack Carr
(5). The purpose here is limited - to take again the
skeleton out of the cupboard, namely the U.S. Economic
Stabilization Program of 1971-1974 and try to ask
some questions similar to the previous quantitative studies
about its effects, as well as some other questions which
were perhaps not so much looked into before.- 4 -
II. OVERVIEW OF THE E.S.P.
For a variety of reasons not so important here, the Federal
Reserve System's monetary policy from the early sixties to the
imposition of controls by President Nixon on August 15, 1971
was basically to inject money into the economy at an accele-
rating pace; it comes then as no surprise that the trend rate
of inflation also accelerated. Those responsible for. the
printing presses though, did not exactly assumed responsibility
for the discomforting outcome of it all and the well-loved
myths of monopoly power either on the side of business or
labour, to explain undefeatable inflation were nurtured by
businessmen, unionists and politicians alike in an atmosphere
of self-delusion. Retrospectively it comes then as no surprise
that when the controls program was announced the only manda-
tory restrictive ceiling was that on increases in nominal
wages in unionized firms - in plain words,an attempt at meddling
with the monopoly power of unions, with the sins of wages.
Following the main lines of a much more detailed description
of the four Phases of the E.S.P. program by Darby ( 6. ) i
shall here give a summary of their main characteristics.
Phase I: 1971,9 - 1971,11
It was argued that the E.S.P. could speed the adjustment to
a: lower rate of inflation by reducing inflationary expecta-
tions and revising labour contracts since the wage demands of
nonunionized workers and the agreed wages in union contracts
included an adjustment for expected inflation. The temporary
decrease in employment linked to a reduced growth rate in the
money supply could thus be reduced or obliterated. This
initial freeze on nominal wages was conceived as a surprise -at-
tack in order to avoid anticipatory strategic wage and price
increases while a more sophisticated controls program was
being prepared. The price freeze restricted most prices just
trivially if at all.- 5 -
Phase II: 1971,12 - 1972,12
Prices were allowed to increase proportionately to increases
in costs, but this profit margin rule was a binding ceiling only
where there were major shifts in relative demand or supply.
The rate of inflation could then only be affected by the pro-
gram if the rate at which costs were growing was checked by
wage controls which is what characterized Phase II.
Nearly all unionized firms could still hire all the labour
they wanted under the controlled wage rate and an
incentive to evade the wage controls due to fear of losing
employees did not actually existed. The main effect of controls
on union wages was to increase the number of workers which
unionized firms were ready to employ.
Prior approval to raise prices was required, but firms which
in normal circumstances, would have, increased their prices by
a certain amount, were able to meet the smaller legal ceiling
by making up the difference by reducing the quality of the
products so as to reduce their unit costs.
Therefore the reported price indices was an underestimate of
the real ones since they did not allow for the drop in product
quality.
Phase III: 1973,1 - 1973,6
Prior approval of price increases except in a few industries
was removed for large firms although the profit margin of the
previous phases remained binding as did the previous 5.5%
annualized standard for nominal wage increases. As a result,
quoting Darby ( 6 ), these firms were free to increase their
prices not only in proportion to the increase in costs required
to produce a unit of given quality but also in proportion to
the increased costs necessary to restore the previous degraded
quality. Since this restoration in quality, was not taken into
account,the reported rate of inflation was an overestimate,- 6 -
although the difference between the reported price level and
the "true" one was not completely reduced. As a result the
annualized rate of inflation in these first six months of
1973 looked six percent points higher than in the last six
months of 19 72 and Phase III was stopped to give way to the
next and last period of the E.S.P.
Phase IV: 1973,7 - 1974,4
A freeze on prices was initially attempted at the beginning
of this period with nominal wages, however, allowed to rise
as before. Shortages and illegal evasion of the controls be-
came then the rule as firms were confronted with frozen prices
lower than their market level. After only two month the previous
notification and approval of price increases which had charac-
terized Phase II was reinstated. The unit profit limit was
again largely ignored but apparently binding enough so as to
cause in the end the E.S.P. supporters on the business side
to join the unions in calling for an end of the controls.
III. QUANTIFYING THE EFFECTS OF WAGE AND PRICE CONTROLS
It is evident that the effect of controls cannot simply be
gauged by a direct comparison of the rates of wage and price
change before the imposition of controls and the rates of
change during them. Other factors affecting the labour market,
like for instance a change in fiscal or monetary policy may
have influenced the path of wage - price inflation. To pro-
perly assess the effect of controls one needs an economic
model explaining the normal process of wage and price deter-
mination. Standard practice has always been to generate
forecasts with this estimated model over the period of controls
and compare the actual observed values of the relevant variables
with the predicted ones to give an estimate of the "shock"
on the normal development of variables such as wages and
prices resulting from the enforcement of controls.- 7 -
A common procedure has been to use structural models of wage-
price determination, normally some variant of the expectations
augmented Phillips curve relationships, based on a trade-off
between inflation and unemployment. For instance
W = f1(P
e,U,n)
P = f2(W, H,PI)
where
W = rate of growth of money wages
P = rate of change in prices
U = unemployment rate
IT = rate of growth of labour productivity
PI = rate of change of import prices
P = expected rate of inflation
In relation to the endogenous variables in a model such as
the last one, the policy impact is normally captured by using
the estimated reduced forms. This procedure of course intro-
duces an element of arbitrariness since the values of the
"exogenous" variables which are necessary to generate counter
factual predictions of the endogenous variables during the
period of controls may have themselves been contaminated by
the controls program. Recent research carried aout by Sims (25)
rejects the hypothesis that, variables such as U and GNP
can be considered exogenous im a "structural" model similar
to the one above.
For instance one could argue that import prices PI in a system
of flexible exchange rates, will be affected by controls in
the case of inflationary expectation being actually revised
down by controls.
Productivity growth also may be affected by increased friction
in labour markets. Even the observed unemployment rate during
the controls may be partly affected by them if the initial
apparent success in bringing down the rates of wage and price
inflation gives ground to the government to believe that they
have effectively pushed down the Phillips curve southwesterly
and tempts policy makers into increasing the rate of money_ Q _
expansion by more than they should. This last type of perverse
effect seems to have been the case in the U.S. after the
initial apparent success of Phase I.
A further problem of this traditional approach even assuming
that the structural equations are properly specified and
suitable estimated (which very often has not been the case,
see Oi ( 1V)), is the assumption of structural stability which
may be a strong assumption to make if anticipation of and
reaction to wage-price controls have altered the structure of
the wage-price equations in the periods preceding and following
the controls period, since the observations corresponding to
these periods are normally used to fit the "normal" structure
imposed on "policy-off" observations.
I cannot extend myself here to give an exhausting review of
the main econometric criticisms of the numerous empirical
studies using these type of simulation techniques and/or inter-
cept dummy variables to model the impact of incomes policy
(the interested reader should refer to Oi ( 17 ), although some
of these difficulties referred to , and quite some more will
always be present when attempting a quantification of the
"shock" of controls by the above mentioned or alternative
techniques like the ones used in this paper.
The approach used here is the identification, fitting and
further use for generating counterfactual predictions of
several variables,of time series models of the ARIMA type
developed by Box-Jenkins. The rationale for doing so is ex-
plained in more detail in section IV.
An identical methodological approach has been used by Feige
and Pearce ( 8 ) to also investigate the impact of the E.S.P.
on several variables, albeit, only during Phase I and Phase II
of the E.S.P. However their study concentrated on the effect
upon the Consumer Price Index, Wholesale Price Index .and
Average Hourly Earnings for the whole private nonfarm economy.- 9 -
On the other hand in this paper only the manufacturing
sector is considered since after all, the manufacturing sector
in the U.S.A. is heavily unionized and as we have already
seen in Section II, controls were aimed first and foremost
at the unionized firms. Furthermore in Feige and Pearce study,
no considerations about the effect of controls on real wages
were taken into account, since they did not estimate directly
a real wage generating process like it is done here and the
only conclusions one could draw from their study about real
wages were of an indirect nature by comparing relative move-
ments in wages and prices. A procedure which in their study
must be looked at with suspicion, since they used seasonally
adjusted data to fit the wage equation doing away with one
of the main advantages of ARIMA models which is their ability
to describe "seasonality", "trend" and "residual" series
under the umbrella of one overall model.
A reason to emphasize directly real wage effects should be
clear from the description of the several Phases in section II.
Not only the impact on wages and prices may have been asymme-
trical but also the underreported rate of inflation as a result
of a drop in product quality is an interesting point on its
own. The neoclassical theory of employment determination, postu-
lates a negative relationship between real wages and employ-
ment with changes in real wages preceding changes in employ-
ment as we know.
It would be impossible for any government to monitor any
policy of direct meddling with the real wage through controls
as a means to increase employment without their statistical
agencies allowing for changes in product quality to construct
a price index which would really be the one upon which firms
take their decisions to either hire or fire workers.
A conscious attempt at increasing employment through decreased
real wages does not seem to have been the stated aim of the- 10 -
economists who tailored the E.S.P., although if decreases in
real wages occurred during the E.S.P. accompanied by increases
in employment like some evidence presented here seems to point
out to, it would also be a meaningful axercise to attempt some
preliminary investigation of how the real wage-employment
nexus, if any, was affected by controls.- 11 -
IV. USE AND JUSTIFICATION OF ARIMA MODELS
The starting point of the Box and Jenkins approach is the as
sumption that the observations from a time series y, are
realizations from a stochastic process. As proved by Wold
( 21 ), for any stationary stochastic process there exists a
linear decomposition in the form of a weighted sum of random
shocks e
yt = ^(B)et (1)
2 3 where ty (B) = 1 +ij; ^B+ij^B +4»3B +
and B is the lag operator B e = Be., and the random shocks
e. satisfy
E(e.) - 0, E(e.e. ) = a
 2I.
U. t U- S £
In order to transform equation (1) into a more amenable form
for estimation, Box and Jenkins developed a parsimonious
general class of time series models known as autoregressive
integrated moving average models (ARIMA) and represented in
their simplest form as
0(B)A
dyt = 9(B) et, A
d = (1 - B)
d
where 0(B) = 1 - 0 B - 09B
2 - ... - 0 B
p is a p^ order
P d
polynomial with roots outside the unit circle, A y. is the
d— difference of the series y, necessary to achieve stationa-
rity and finally 9(B) is a q— order polynomial with roots
outside the unit circle.
One can then say that time series y. has a representation
as an ARIMA (p, d, q) process which not only is it able to
yield a model like (1) but also, if certain invertibility- 12 -
conditions are met (see Box & Jenkins), an autoregressive
process of infinite order of the form
0(B)9~
1(B)A
dyt = et (2)
or n(B)Ayt = et
An appealing feature of ARIMA models is that they can be inter-
preted as adaptive or error learning forecasting models which
include as a subset the well known adaptive expectations models
of the Koyck and Cagan sort. To bring this point out, one can
represent any stationary series like
yt -
and .use as a forecasting criterion that the forecast of y. for
a lead time I, Y^-^o > "Minimizes the expected mean square fore-
cast error
If we now use a set of weights V* to define the optimal fore-
2
1
cast y,(l) which minimizes E[e (£)j , we can write
0
0 *
yt(£) - j£:O \-t-j
 et-j , weighted average of those error terms
which we can estimate
Therefore the expected mean square forecast error at time t is
which is minimized for y* . = f ., Vj
that is E[e^(£)] = ffQ f I a£
2 (4)- 13 - toW
Thus the minimum expected mean square forecast of yt+. is
written as
y.(£) = .Z V n^.e^ • (5)
which can be seen to be the conditional expectation of y, „ at
time t on present and past shocks
since E[e. .] = o for j >o
Similarly the £-step ahead forecast made at time
t+1 is y(£) = .1 f „,.£.
3=o £+j t
and since ytU+1) = JI





which tells us , the expected value of the series y, in the
future, namely, the period t+£+1 is revised when new infor
mation is received.
Moreover the random shocks driving the stochastic process y,





since V = 1 as can be seen by equating coefficients on
different powers of B in equation- 14 -
So the economic unit at time t+1, revises all his previous
expectations of future values of the series y, by the amount
e. i after he experiences an error, et+-i/ in his previous e
forecast of y, for t+1.
Now it can be easily seen that the well known adaptive expec-
tations model of Koyck and Cagan (4.) is a very
particular example of this class of models since it can be
written as
Ayt = d-e1B)et
or yt = y(B)et
where f(B) = —,~ 2V giving ¥. = 1-0 Vi, which means that
as result of using the same weights T's, the economic unit
forecasts the same value of y, for all future time periods.
Thus, refering back to the general class of ARIMA models,
they can be said to use optimally all the predictive infor-
mation contained in the past history of a series.
At a first superficial glance one might easily dismiss ARIMA
models as rather "naive" forecasting tools when compared to
bigger structural econometric models, since an ARIMA appears
seemingly to explain the development of a series over time
ignoring prevailing economic theory which would take into
account all the possible influences and feedback of other
relevant variables, which might be used to impose a particu-
lar structure on the data to generate a more powerful fore-
casting tool.
That this criticism is in principle valid is undeniable but
fortunately can be qualified to a great extent since it turns- 15 -
out that the effect of other variables upon the series y
we are attempting to forecast may already be contained in
the past history of that series. As shown by Zellner and
Palm ( 22 ) the ARIMA models, represent the "final form"
for a variable implied by a very sophisticated model indeed.
They show that a multivariate time series process will under
very general assumptions always yield a set of processes ge-
nerating individual variables, which have an autoregressive-
moying average (ARMA) form.
To emphasize this extremely important point, let us use as an
illustration a simplified version of the expectations aug-


















W, = rate of growth of money wages
n, = rate of growth in labour productivity
P. = rate of change of prices
PI. = rate of change of import prices






If we now consider the vector
z't = (W. ,P., f(U,),II,, PIt) as being generated by a multiple
time series process it can be represented in matrix form as
H(B)Zt = F(B)Et t=1f..... T (9)- 16 -






r °f random errors
such that E(et) = 0, E(ete£+g) = 5t t+sI Vt,s
And the matrices H(B), F(B) are both 5x5 matrices assumed
nonsingular, whose elements are finite polynomials in the
lag operator B and we denote as
H..(B) and F..(B) where i,j=1, ... 5
Now what economic theory does is to impose "prior" information
of exogeneity in the form
H±;. (B) = 0, F±j(B) = 0
for some i,j elements, to identify a structural model like (8)
which can be used to generate causal equations known as reduced
forms which relate functionally the current value of a variable
A.
such as W to the lagged endogenous and current and lagged
exogenous variables and have traditionally been used in the
econometric literature using simulation and dummy variables to
assess empirically the effect of incomes control upon certain
policy target variables such as wage or price inflation (Gordon
(10 ), Eckstein and Brinner (7 ), Perry ( 19 ), Lipsey &
Parkin ( 16 ) ) .




we can write Z = H(B)F(B)e
or H^ Jt H(B)
where H
ad^"(B) = adjoint matrix of H(B)
H(B)| = determinant of H(B) which of course is a scalar,
finite polynomial in B.- 17 -
If the invertibility condition, |H(B)j = 0 has roots outside the
unit circle, is satisfied we can express each variable in
our vector
z't = (wt,Pt,f(ut),nt, Pit)
as a finite order ARMA equations, since
H(B)|zt = H
Adj>(B)F(B)et
or |H(B)|Zfc = 0(B)et (10)
where Q(B) = H
Adj*(B)F(B)efc
and Z. for i = 1 , 2 , ... 5 can be represented as | H (B) | Z . = 0 ! e .
i = 1, . . .5
where 0! = (Q . * , Q . ~r • • • -Q • <=) is the i - row of the 6 matrix.
Note now that 0!e. is a sum of moving average processes which
can be represented as a moving average process in a single
random variable.
Thus the ARMA processes for individual variables like the ones
in vector Z' may be consistent with the "true"model dictating
the behaviour of these variables ,* and as a result they are
suitable for forecasting purposes albeit not so for structural
analysis. As shown by Nelson (14 ), expectations based on
these univariate ARIMA models will in general have a larger
mean squared error than expectations which are rational in the
sense that they employ all the available information in the
model, but as pointed out by Feige & Pearce ( 8 ) one must take
into account the information costs incurred in the process of
forming rational expectations. If we assume that the information
cost for an economic unit to acquire information about the past
history of a variable is relatively small, that is an added
bonus to legitimate the use of ARIMA models as a clever fore-
casting tool.
To conclude, the identification estimation and further use
for forecasting of univariate ARIMA models can be seen as an
(which may not necessarily be one like (8)).- 18 -
astute way of opening up carefully the Pandora's box that the
real world is and let the data inside tell us an interesting
and hopefully informative tale.
On the other hand, the imposition of sometimes too much
arbitrary "a priori" theory and unsuitable econometric metho-
dology to enable us to accept or reject the imposed structure
(see Granger & Newbold (11 ) for study of nonsense regres-
sions and spurious fits all-pervasive in the econometric
literature), may be tantamount at times to a rash opening of
the box's lid and remembering the good old myth, by so doing,
Hope alone remained inside the box when all objects of desire
were scattered to play havoc among mankind.
V. ESTIMATED ARIMA MODELS
The starting point is then to identify and estimate the ARIMA
models most suitable to describe the underlying process gene-
rating the time series we are interested in. The identification
procedure involves a detailed examination of the sample auto-
correlation and partial autocorrelation functions which will
point towards a suitable degree of differencing (parameter d)
to achieve stationarity and the order p and q of the autore-
gressive and moving average terms respectively, (see Box and
Jenkins (2 ))• Once the process has been initially identi-
fied, we choose that set of parameter values which will mini-
mize the sum of squared residuals
S(0,0) = lz
2,
where et = 0~
1(B)0(B)A
dyfc
and 0' = (0r...0 ), e
1 = (e^.-.B )
since by assumption the error terms e....e. are all normally
2
distributed and independent with mean 0 and variance a , their- 19 -
joint density is
f(e1fe,...e ) =a-
I ^ T £
So that the conditional log likelihood function associated with
the parameter values (0,e,oe) is given by
2
L(0,0,a ) = -T log a - £et
As we then can see, minimizing the sum of squared residuals
2
S(0,0) = £e. with respect to the parameters 0,0 gives us their
maximum likelihood estimates when the errors are assumed to
be normally distributed. The minimization of the function
S(0,0) which is nonlinear in the parameters, requires the
application of iterative methods to achieve that set of para-
meters satisfying a preestablished convergence requirement-
One an ARIMA model has been fitted, the next step in assessing
its adequacy is the checking of whether or not the residuals
e seem to be white noise as indeed they must be if the model
is suitable. This is normally done by examining the estimated
residuals correlogram
which under the hypothesis of serialindependence should be them
selves uncorrelated, normally distributed random variables
with mean 0 on variance 1/T.
Complementary also, a "portmanteau"test devised by Box and
Pierce follows immediately by summing up several individual




under the hypothesis of the residuals being white noise.- 20 -
These different steps of identification, estimation and diag-
nostic checking were applied using monthly data (since the
timing and length of the different phases of the ESP makes
it desirable) for the period 1953,7 - 1971,8, prior to the
imposition of controls for the following variables, all ex-
pressed as annualized monthly rates of change (see Appendix








Wholesale Price Index (Manufacturing)




The results are reported in Table 1 where as can be seen some





The diagnostic checking of the residuals e with the exception
of those obtained from the CPI model (quite high Q statistic)
was considered generally satisfactory and the models reported
in Table I were used to generate simulated values over the ESP
different periods to be compared with the reported actual values
of the different series and thus obtain a quantitative estimate
of the impact of controls.- 21 -
TABLE 1 Estimated ARIMA models
maximum likelihood estimates and associated standard
errors - Monthly data: 1953,7 - 1971,8
CPI : - (1-O.84B)e
(0.03)
Q(41) = 49.4 a =2.37
WPI 1-B)yt = (1-O.69B)e
(0.049)













Q(40) = 24.60 a = 12.36
£
RWC (1-B










32 a = 5.47
£- 22 -
VI. MODEL SIMULATION DURING THE ESP
Some of the caveats related to using wage-price structural
models to generate counterfactual predictions during the
period of controls which have already been mentioned in
section III, apply as well to the methods described here.
If models such as those reported in Table I are supposed to
characterise the processes generating those variables and
if the imposition of controls shocks these normal processes,
we can then generate optimal ARIMA forecasts from the models
in Table I to be compared with the actual data during the
controls. But would the ARIMA simulated values reproduce
faithfully the path of those variables which would have
taken place without controls?
In order to do so they would have ideally to take into account
all the shocks affecting these variables in the absence of
controls.
Therefore, generating updated, one-step ahead forecasts
would be ideally suited since they are continously updated
based on post sample observations. However this post-sample
observations could be really misobservations, when the actual
shocks do not match the hypothetical ones. Unfortunately,
there is no available methodology, as mentioned in Feige and
Pearce ( 9 ) to relate hypothetical with actual shocks and
therefore it makes sense to use our estimated ARIMA models
to generate also deterministic, £-step ahead forecasts during
the period of controls. Since these £-step ahead forecasts
assume that all future random shocks take on their expected
value of zero and are based only on sample period data, they
are not affected by events in the period of controls, 1971,9
- 1974,4.- 23 -
Both deterministic and updated simulated values were calculated
using the estimated models of Table I and compared with
actual post-sample realizations. The results for the four
phases of the ESP are reported in Tables 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7
and plotted in Figures 1 to 6.
The reported standard deviations of forecast error reported
in the Tables make use of the fact that
var [i|1aiet(i)] = J^ var|>t(i)] +
i^. zaiajcov[et(i)et(j)] + . 5 .
where a is a constant (in our case 1/i). We have already seen
in section IV that
And one can also derive immediately the following expression
for the covariances
Since by definition the updated forecasts are uncorrelated,
we take into account the covariances only for the computation
of the standard deviation of the deterministic £-step ahead
forecast errors.
t. The Consumer Price Index CPI
Table 2 presents average values of the actual and simulated
series for the different Phases and the month to month va-
riability is depicted in Figure 1.
The results from both types of forecast is quite the same.
An initial, albeit insignificant drop in the rate of CPI
Note: The reported standard deviation of forecast errors are under-
estimates since we are using the estimated values from the ¥weights
and not the unobservable real ones.FIGURE 1 Actual and simulated annualized monthly rates of change in the














Phase IV: 1973,7-1974,4TABLE 2 Actual and simulated rate of change (annualized) of the Consumer Price Index CPI
(Number in brackets: standard error of forecast)

























































































































Difference outside two standard errors of forecast.- 26 -
inflation during Phase I was followed by an also insignificant
impact during Phase II with a significant but positive im-
pact during Phases III and IV. All Phases taken together give
an estimate which points out towards higher rate of CPI in-
flation as a result of controls, but since it is not outside
two standard deviations of forecast error, we cannot conclude
that CPI inflation on average was really higher than what it
would have been without controls.
2. Wholesale Price Index (Manufacturing) WPI
As we can see from Table 3, both type of forecasts show that
during Phase II the simulated values exceeded the actual by
more than two standard errors, indicating that during Phase I
controls seem to have been successful in bringing down the
rate of WPI inflation between 6 and 8% less than what it
would have been in the absence of the freeze. However, when
we take into account the seemingly positive impact during
Phase II the overall negative impact on WPI inflation for
these two phases taken together seems negligible. Similarly to
the CPI case, during Phases III and IV producer prices seem
to have increased faster as a result of controls than what
they would have done without them. The overall effect of all
Phases was as well a positive one, although only within
one standard error.
3. Average Hourly Earnings (Manufacturing) WHE
Table 4 and Figure 3 report the results for this variable.
None of the differences between actual and forecast values
exceeded two standard errors for any of the Phases of the
ESP, although there seemed to be a sizable downward effect
on the WHE rate of change during Phase I followed by quite
small effects of alternated signs in the remaining different
periods of controls.FIGURE 2 ; Actual and simulated annualized monthy rates of change in the wholesale

















1973,7-1974,4TABLE 3 Actual and simulated rate of change (annualized) of the Wholesale Price Index WPI
(Number in brackets: standard error of forecast)




































UPDATED FORECASTS: (one-step ahead forecasts)
Period Precontrols Average
1970,5-1971,8 Phase I # Phase II
| Average
I I & II Phase III Phase IV




































0.82FIGURE 3 : Actual and simulated annualized monthly rates of change in the manufacturing






1971 1972 1973 1974
Phase I : 1971,9-1971,11, Phase II: 1971,12-1972,12
Phase III: 1973,1-1973,6, Phase IV: 1973,7-1974,4TABLE 4 Actual and simulated rate of change (annualized) of the nominal wage WHE
(Number in brackets: standard error of forecast)






















































































Combining the results for nominal wages WHE and prices CPI
and WPI, some indication of a total average drop in the con-
sumer real wage rate of change and a somewhat bigger decrease
in the producer real wage can be detected. This result corro-
borates other previous evidence like that of Parkin ( 18 )
for the U.K., pointing out to a redistribution of income un-
favourable to labour during control periods. One should not
try to run away too easily with the conclusion that the
connection between controls and the drop in the labour's share
in national income is all that strong but nevertheless a type
of controls like those used during the ESP may very likely
have had a bigger impact on employment income than on prices
of final output and consequently on profit margins.
More statistically satisfactory evidence of this type of effect
is found as we shall see further below, when we look at the
counterfactual forecasts of both real wage series taken on
their own.
4. Manufacturing Employment EM
If one believes in long-term Phillips curves, and pushing them
about, a succesful incomes policy would be judged on the basis
of how effective the controls were in allowing increased em-
ployment at inflation rates below those which might have
occurred without the controls. From the results in Tables 2
and 3 for the rates of CPI and WPI we have already seen that
there's no conclusive evidence that these last two variables
were significanly reduced and as a matter of fact they increased
in the last two Phases. An increase in employment might
still have been possible and in reality the actual rate of
change in employment seemed to rise for the controls periods
as whole as can be seen in Table 5. The initial impact of
controls seemed to increase the willingness to hire workers by
the unionized firms but the overall effect on employment during
the ESP may also reflect a simultaneous expansionist
monetary policy during specially Phase II since the rate of
money growth increased substantially during this period asFIGURE 4 : Actual and simulated annualized monthly rates of change in the
manufacturing sector employment EM
I




Phase I : 1971,9-1971,11, Phase II: 1971,12-1972,12
Phase III: 1973,1-1973,6, Phase IV: 1973,7-1974,4TABLE 5 Actual and simulated rate of change (annualized) of employment EM
(Number in brackets: standard error of forecast)
















































































the reported success of the freeze during the first months of
the ESP allowed more room for heating up the economy during
the whole of 1972. (Ihe rate of monetary expansion during 1972
averaged 9 % versus 2.5 % during Phase I and 6 % during 1971).
When looking at the results from Table 5, we cannot conclude
that controls were significantly effective (even indirectly
through the just mentioned expansionary self-delusion) in
increasing employment by more than it would have been without
them.
It would not be, however, strictly correct to make assumptions
about the effect of controls on prices and employment without
some complementary assumption as to what course monetary
policy would have taken without the ESP. However, I do not
think that this problem could be dealt with similarly as we
have already done with other variables since to use
forecasts from an ARIMA model fitted to money .supply before
the imposition of controls in order to measure the alternative
monetary policy that the Federal Reserve System would have
followed in the absence of controls does seem to be neither
a statistically nor a theoretically sound practice. We shall
assume therefore that the course of monetary policy after
controls cannot be meaningfully distinguished from its course
before them.
Bearing in mind then, that controls nevertheless may have
affected indirectly the course of monetary policy, one might
also rationalize an increase in the rate of change in employ-
ment as partly a short term reflection of the fact that the
producer real wage RWW might have been falling at a faster
rate that the consumer real wage RWC and preceding it.
This is in effect what a neoclassical equilibrium monetarist
theory would predict, since increases in employment through- 35 -
unanticipated inflation (brought about for instance by an acce-
leration in the money supply) require according to this short-
run view of the Phillips curve that the demand for labour
(identified by a producer real wage) responds always quicker
than the supply of it (identified by a consumer real wage)
which is equivalent to stating that a producer price index WPI
changes should precede changes in the CPI.
The Tables 6 and 7 reporting the results for the producer real
wage RWW and the consumer real wage RWC seem to bring some
evidence on these just mentioned possible effects although
the lack of parallel evidence on Table 5 about significant
increases in the rate of change in employment is not necessa-
rily at odds with the last argument due to the necessarily
lagged response of employment to changes in the real wage
(Fixed length of contracts, labour adjustment costs, etc..)
5. Producer Real Wage RWW
The estimates of Table 6, point out to a significant decrease
in the producer real wage of a quite substantial magnitude in
Phases III and IV and also significant drop for the whole ESP
considered as a whole. An ambivalent although unsignificant
effect was estimated for Phases I and II.
6. Consumer Real Wage RWC
In Table 7, one can observe that the consumer real wage appears
to have increased significantly after the first two Phases,
thus corroborating Gordon results (10 ) in which he concluded
that labour might have been favoured initially by the controls
and giving counterevidence to the results of Feige & Pearce
( 9 ) which stated just the opposite. However as we move on
to the results for Phase III and IV we can see that by the
last Phase the consumer real wage had also dropped signifi-
cantly although not by as much an amount as the producer real
wage RWW, which also if we remember, was also significantly
reduced during Phase III..FIGURE 5 : Actual and simulated annualized monthly rates of change
in the producer real wage (manufacturing) RWW
I




Phase I : 1971,9-1971,11, Phase II: 1971,12-1972,12
Phase III: 1973,1-1973,6, Phase IV: 1973,7-1974,4TABLE 6 Actual and simulated rate of change (annualized) of the producer real wage RWW
(Number in brackets: standard error of forecast)






























UPDATED FORECASTS: (one-step ahead forecasts)
Period Precontrols Average
1970,5-1971,8 Phase I Phase II Average












































-5.91FIGURE 6 : Actual and simulated annualized monthly rates of change
in the consumer real wage (manufacturing) RWC
U)
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1973,7-1974,4TABLE 7 Actual and simulated rate of change (annualized) of the consumer real wage RWC
(Number in brackets: standard error of forecast)
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CO- 40 -
An all Phases average of the effect of controls upon the
consumer real wage came out negative but not significantly
so, a result which evidently takes into account the initial
increase of the RWC during the first two Phases.
VII. AN INTERVENTION ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF CONTROLS
The so called intervention analysis developed by Box and
Tiao (3 ), gives also a complementary test to pick up
some possible effect of incomes policy on the variables we
have just been considering.
Intervention models are basically transfer function models
in which the input variables are dummy variables normally
called "Pulses" or "steps". The first one is used to model
a temporary change in the level or slope of a time series
(e.g.a strike) and the last one is used to test for a per-
manent change in the level of a time series (like in our
case due to the imposition of controls) and also in its slope.
Like normal dummies they take a value of "1" for the period
of incomes policy and "0" elsewhere, but the theoretical
justification of intervention models is somewhat different
as in the case of normal intercept or slope dummies combined
with standard econometric models. To illustrate the way inter-
vention analysis works, let us break down a series Y into
two components D,and N
Yt = Dt+Nt (11)
where D = part of y which can be determined exactly in
terms of any input X .
N = "noise" or error term which cannot be explained in
terms of Xt< It picks up all the "omitted" X-variables.
A general way to represent the relationship between D and X.
is with a linear dynamic relationship of the form




 Z- 41 -
where the transfer tunction V(B) = u)(B) b consists of
W
B
a moving average to (B) operator, an autoregressive operator
6(B) and a pure delay parameter b representing the number of
periods before the change in the input X, begins to have an
effect on Y, .
In general, the noise will be non-stationary and may be re-
presented normally by an ARIMA (p,d,q)
A
dN = 0(B) 0 (B)"
1et (13)
which in combination with the model for D yields a transfer
function-noise model.
Now if we want to investigate the effect of incomes policy
by using an intervention "step" variable E.. as input we can
postulate initially a transfer function of the form
yt = w(B)6"
1(B)St_b (14)
whose parameters can be estimated by the methods described
in Box and Jenkins ( ). However since we cannot use
prewhitening to identify the structure of model (14) like in
the case of normal transfer function models, the problem has
to be tackled by introducing the noise structure N into the
intervention model. To do so, we assume a process generating
a series without any abnormal event being yet considered.
Referring back to the estimated model for the rate of change
in employment EM described in section V., we can represent it
as
AA
12yt = (1-6-jB) (1-e12B
12)et (15)
where the model fitted to the series y. = rate of change in
employment, does not include the incomes policy periods. It- 42 -




where the noise term N. describes how the series y. is gene-
rated in the absence of incomes policy.
If the parameters in the polynomials co(B) and S (B) are zero
we can then obtain a first guess of the structure of the noise
Nt
AA
12Nt = (1-B.jB) (1-ei2B
12)et (17)













which yields maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters
in o)(B), 6 (B) and the parameters 6, by minimising the sum of
squared residuals e. by nonlinear methods.
Models like (18), assuming that only u> j4 o in the polynomial
w(B), not including parameters of 6(B) and with a parameter
b=o would be thus equivalent to test for the hypothesis that
controls bring about an upward or downward shift in the level
of the variables we are studying, but leaves the underlying
process generating them unchanged- 43 -
in this sense a model such as
Yt = wo5t+d-91B) (1-ei2B
12)et (19)
AA
where E, - 1 in all the months of the controls program, tests
for some significant average effect of incomes policy on the
rate of change of employment without taking into account the
time pattern of adjustment to a new level which would be
allowed for instance by a model such as
yt = u)o(1-6B)~
1 ? t+(1^B) (1-el2B
12)et (20
AA
Models like (19) for the rate of change in employment, were
estimated for all the other variables, CPI, WPI, WHE, RWW and
RWC with the noise model N varying across them as can be
immediately seen from the fitted ARIMA models in Table 1.
According to whether the separate effects of the four phases
of the controls, the first two lumped together or the over-
all effect of controls were taken into account, the results
are respectively reported in Tables 8, 9 and 10.
A comforting outcome is that the results of the intervention
analysis are very much in line with the results from the
counterfactual simulations already reported in section VI.
Magnitude, sign and significance of coefficients are a con-
firmation of the results we have already seen and commented upon in
section VI; with the most striking result again, the negative
impact on both real wages but of a bigger magnitude and unam-
biguous in the case of the producer real wage RWW.TABLE 8 INTERVENTION ANALYSIS (Different Phases separately)





















































































* = significant at 0.05 levelTABLE 9 INTERVENTION ANALYSIS (Phase I & Phase II combined)










































































* = significant at 0.05 leveLTABLE 10 INTERVENTION ANALYSIS (All Phases combined)











































* - significant at 0.05 level- 47 -
VIII. CAUSALITY TESTS
Referring back to the problem already mentioned in section II
and III about the observed rates of price inflation not re-
flecting the real ones, because of changes in the quality of
products, it is an interesting exercise in itself to try to
find some empirical evidence of the effect of this type of
phenomenon on employment decisions. Firms basing their de-
cisions to hire or lay off workers upon the producer real
wage RWW would not do so by taking into account the reported
rate of inflation in WPI but rather they will consider prices
in their output which already allow for the change in quality
they may have caused so as to restore their desired profit
margins (only of course when the ceiling on the prices of the
output they sell is binding enough to give them an incentive
to do so).
The message in money wages data may as well be affected by
controls, since firms and employees will find it relatively
easy to evade wage controls as long as they find it beneficial
to do so.in competitive labour markets employers will be in-
terested in dodging controls by means such as labour upgrading
or overreported number of hours worked if they think they will
lose valuable employees otherwise. In the unionized U. S. manu-
facturing sector however, and during the first two Phases at
least, firms seem to have been able to hire the number of em-
ployees they wanted under the enforced wage rate and therefore
the incentive to evade controls was not so strong.- 48 -
The last argument points towards a niisreported real wage coining
more from prices than from wages.
We have already seen in section II that firms seemingly star-
ted to restore quality during Phase III and Phase IV. The
overall effect on the reported rate of inflation is not clear-
cut, although it might have been also misreported for the ESP
taken as a whole . An attempt to bring out some evidence
this respect can be carried out by means of Granger causality




e Pierce-Haugh ( 20 ) variety between real
wages and employment.
In short, the basic idea can be put down as follows:
Let us imagine that the process generating the rate of change in
employment can be modelled like
yt = 0-
1(B)e2(B)£2t
The residuals e^. can be viewed as that part of y. which cannot
be predicted from its own past history. Therefore if one were
to improve the forecasts of y, using extra information, like
for instance, a real wage X modelled by
The shocks or innovations E... should be correlated with E-,
(Reason for not simply cross-correlating the prewhitened
y series, £„ with the X series is that the resulting cross-
correlation function may be misleading due to serial corre-
lation in the X series (see Bartlett ( 23 )).
When a series such as X provides additional information about
future values of y, or in other words reduces the expected
mean square forecast error below that of a model of y, based- 49 -
only on its own past history, we can say that X. is a
"leading indicator" of y. or that satisfies the condition
stated by Granger (11 ) necessary to say that X causes y.
(For a more detailed description see Pierce and Haugh (20 )).
The idea of Granger causality however is based on the use of
an information set which may be bigger than just two variables
X and y. Therefore discussing causality in the way we have done
so far,would be equivalent to consider information sets with
only two elements; that is to consider causal relationships
pair-wise amongst a selected group of variables. With this
proviso in mind one can then proceed further and test for the
existence or not of causality by cross-correlating the inno-
vations e. of the processes generating the variables in our
information set.








where k = positive,negative or zero lag.
As shown by Haugh ( 13 ), if p 1 o , ^ o for some k > o one can
say that "X causes y",on the other hand if p 1 -, ,^ o for some
£ I £ ^ , K
k < o then "y causes X". If for both k < o and k > o
P 1P o v^ ° there's feedback, and finally when p 1p ~ ^ o
£ I £ Z , K El £t;O
the direction of causality is indeterminate and nothing can be





 k can one say that the
series yt and Xfc, in our case employment and real wages, are
strictly independent. However, as pointed out by Sims (25)
these may be a tendency for the crosscorrelationsto be biased
towards zero due to specification error.- 50 -
Since the population cross-correlogram p 1 0 , is unobser-
vable we estimate it with the sample residual cross-correlogram
£2t+k
e1e2,k A_ A 1/2
which is in turn an estimate of the sample white noise cross-
correlation re1e2^.
Two basic tests can be employed then to detect causality. The
first is basically to check whether the individual r's exceed
-1/2
the value 2 T since under the null hypothesis of inde-
pendence between both series
where T = number of observations.
Therefore it is straightforward to say that we are approxima-
tely 95% certain of rejecting the null hypothesis when it is
false when we obtain some
-1/2
r" * > 2T
A second,"portmanteau" test, follows immediately by adding up
the squared values of the correlogram, since the assumption
of white noise normality yields
r> "2 2
s = T p rf-ieo^^ X (2p+1) k=-p
2
which can be compared with the relevant value of the x tables
to accept or reject the hypothesis of independence.- 51 -
Correcting for small sample bias and taking into account the
sensitivity of the test to the choosing of lags P, Layton
( 15 ) suggests a scheme of progressive testing such as
a) X causes y if any one of
2





b) y causes X if any one of
S(p) = T z 1(T-|k|)~ r
is significant
c) X and y are independent if none of
2
 P . . -1- 2 2
S(p) = T . _I (T-k) r(k)^x (2p+1) K--p
is significant.
If unidirectional causality is detected, then one should con-
firm it by fitting a transfer function-noise model (see Haugh





And the residuals e.,. obtained from this model should be
cross-correlated with e -, at positive and negative lags to
2 confirm unidirectional causality using a similar x test
as the one explained before.
As we see in Tables 11 and 12 to use the second step does
not appear to promise a substantial pay-off since evidence
on clear cut unidirectional causality between both real wages
RWC and RWW and employment is non-existent from models fitted
to the period prior to the imposition of controls 195 3,7 -
1971,8.TABLE 11 Cross-Correlation between residuals from RWC and EM estimated models




































































































































LnTABLE 12 Cross-Correlation between residuals from RWW and Em estimated models





































































































































The contemporaneous cross-correlation is significant in both
Tables, but nothing can be inferred from that fact as regards
causality. A weak evidence of feedback is detected between
the consumer real wage RWC and employment EM. However, in the
crosscorrelogram between the prewhitened producer real wage
and employment an almost significant at 0.05 level cross-
correlation is found at lag 13 with all other cross-correlations
well insignificant although there's still a sizable cross-
correlation in Table 12 at lag K = -1.
2
The x tests corresponding to Tables 11 and 12 can be summa-
rized as follows
1. RWC and EM
S(61) = 94.32 for k = o,±1,±2, ...±3o




 = 79.1 at o.o5 level. When excluding the signifi-
cant contemporaneous crosscorrelation, the "portmanteau"test
accepts the null hypothesis of independence between both
series but strictly speaking we have to include k = o to con-
clude that both series are independent.
2
Of the progressive x tests a weak evidence of feedback is
picked up since only
S(1) = 4.o9 for k = +1
andS(1) = 4.o7 for k = -1
2
are greater than x (1) = 3.84 at o.o5 level.
2. RWW and EM
Ever the more general "portmanteau"test S(61) = 69.48 cannot
reject independence although we have already seen that signi-
ficant instantaneous crosscorrelation also exists. Of the
2
progressive x tests only S(1) = 3.84 for k = 1 allows us to say
something about a weak keynesian as opposed to neoclassical
causality, running from employment- 55 -
to real wages (with a negative sign if we remember the cross-
correlogram in Table 12.
With the lack of substancial evidence about a clear line of
causality between both definitions of the real wage and employ-
ment it does not seem very promising to analyze separately how
controls might have affected something whose existence proves
to be rather elusive even without them. Nevertheless ARIMA
models for the same three series EM, RWC, RWW were refitted
up to the end of controls in April 1974. The results are
reported in Tables 13 and 14 where one can see that apart
from significant instantaneous causality, the weak evidence
of causal relationships in Tables 11 and 12 (which omit the
control's period) is gone when we take the observations
for the control's time span into account. Therefore some
diluted evidence exists that during the ESP, the reported
real wages did not reflect the "actual" real wages which/
producers and consumers alike would have included in their
information sets.TABLE 13 Cross-Correlation beween residuals from RWC and EM estimated models
"""^——————— ^














































































































































enTABLE 14 Cross-Correlation between residuals from RWW and EM estimated models
——————~ ^














































































































































The empirical analysis of incomes policy has normally been
carried out on the basis of wage and price equations which
are given a structural interpretation. This implies that
all the other variables in this system apart from the endo-
genous wages, prices and also at times price expectations,
are to be considered as "exogenous. It is argued in the text
that it may not be legitimate to consider as exogenous,
variables such as unemployment, productivity and prices of im-
ports. The imposition of controls may affect directly the
path of these assumed exogenous variables during the simulation
performed to quantify the impact of controls on the endo-
genous variables. This simulation is traditionally executed by
the use of reduced forms which of course are obtained by
previously imposing a certain "structure" on a set of variables
of interest. The use of ARIMA models is defended as a short
cut to the problem of imposing too much "a priori" structure.
As proved in the text along the lines of Zellner and Palm (22)
each of the stochastic variables belonging to a dynamic
simultaneous system may be given an ARIMA form under very
general conditions.
ARIMA models can therefore be used as forecasting tools which
are theoretically compatible with the "true" structure of the
model. The results, using ARIMA-generated counterfactual fore-
casts, give some further evidence that controls were not
succussful in fighting down wage or price inflation (apart from
some initial success in Phase I). Unemployment did not seem
either to decrease significantly as a result of imposing con-
trols.
An indirect influence of wage and price controls on the evolution
of real wages through an expansionist monetary policy during
Phase II may have taken place. Policy makers, apparently
mistook the first information to arrive on wages and prices
during Phase I, for an "all-clear" signal to stimulate- 59 -
demand. The evidence on Phases III and IV is consistent
with what a neoclassical equilibrum theory would predict
about the timing in the response of the producers and the
consumer real wages to unanticipated monetary growth.
The results in both sign and nagnitude using counterfactual
simulations based on the estimated ARIMA models were confirmed
to a very high degree when using the "Intervention Analysis"
technique developed by Box and Tiao (3).
The paper concludes with some causality tests between both
definitions of the real wage and employment. The tests are
performed using first data up to the imposition of controls
and secondly using as well the observations corresponding
to the ESP period. It is shown that the weak evidence of
causality existing prior to the enforcement of controls,
disappears when the observations belonging to the controls
period are also used. It is argued that this may give some
indication of an error in variables phenomenon due to the
false message contained in the published price data, since
the latter did not reflect the drop in product quality which
took place, specially during the duration of Phase II.
Statistical Appendix
The variables used are annualized monthly rates of change
using as a basis the following seasonally unadjusted series
1. Consumer Price Index: (Source: Business Statistics )
2. Wholesale Price Index: (Source: Business Statistics )
3. Manufacturing Employment: (Source: U.S. Dept. of Labour
Business Statistics)
4. Average Hourly Earnings: (Source: Business Statistics)
This last series is adjusted for
overtime.- 60 -
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